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The free energy principle says that organisms act to maintain themselves in their
expected states and that they achieve this by minimizing their free energy. This
corresponds to the brain’s job of minimizing prediction error, selective sampling of
sensory data,  optimizing expected precisions,  and minimizing complexity of  in-
ternal models. These in turn map on to perception, action, attention, and model
selection, respectively. This means that the free energy principle is extremely am-
bitious: it aims to explain everything about the mind. The principle is bound to be
controversial, and hostage to empirical fortune. It may also be thought preposter-
ous: the theory may seem either too ambitious or too trivial to be taken seriously.
This chapter introduces the ideas behind the free energy principle and then pro-
ceeds to discuss the charge of preposterousness from the perspective of philo-
sophy of science. It is shown that whereas it is ambitious, controversial and needs
further evidence in its favour, it is not preposterous. The argument proceeds by
appeal to: (i) the notion of inference to the best explanation, (ii) a comparison
with the theory of evolution, (iii) the notion of explaining-away, and (iv) a “bio-
functionalist” account of Bayesian processing. The heuristic starting point is the
simple idea that the brain is just one among our bodily organs, each of which has
an overall function. The outcome is not just a defence of the free energy principle
against various challenges but also a deeper anchoring of this theory in philo-
sophy of science, yielding an appreciation of the kind of explanation of the mind it
offers. 
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1 The brain and other organs
Many organs in the body have a fairly specific
main  function,  such  as  cleaning  or  pumping
blood, producing bile, or digesting. Nothing is
ever  simple,  of  course,  and all  the organs of
the body have highly complex, interconnected
functional roles. The digestive system involves
many different steps; the kidneys help regulate
blood  pressure;  while  the  heart  changes  the
way it pumps in a very complex and context-
dependent manner. Experts in different areas
of human biology have a wealth of knowledge
about the morphology and physiology of  or-
gans, at multiple levels of description. For ex-
ample, much is known about what cellular and
molecular processes occur as the kidneys filter
blood,  or  as  food  is  digested.  Knowledge
about the functions of organs is not yet com-
plete, but there is reasonable agreement about
the  overall  picture—namely,  which  organs
have what function.
But the brain  seems different.  There  is
much less agreement about what is  its main
function, and much less knowledge about how
it fulfills the various functions attributed to it.
Of course, everyone agrees that the brain sub-
serves perception, decision-making, and action
—and perhaps that it is the seat of conscious-
ness, self and soul. There is a reasonable de-
gree of knowledge about some aspects of the
brain,  such  as  the  mechanism behind action
potentials,  and  about  what  happens  when
neurons  fire.  But  most  would  agree  that  it
would be controversial or even preposterous to
claim that there is  one main function of the
brain, on a par with the heart’s pumping of
blood.
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Yet there is an emerging view that claims
that  the  brain  has  one  overarching  function.
There is one thing the brain does, which trans-
lates convincingly to the numerous other func-
tions the brain is engaged in. This chapter will
introduce this idea and will show that, whereas
it may be controversial, the idea is not prepos-
terous. It will help us understand better all the
things that the brain does, how it makes us who
we are, and what we are.
The main version of the idea is labeled the
free energy principle, and was proposed by Karl
Friston (2010). It unifies and develops a number
of different strands of thinking about the brain,
about learning, perception and decision-making,
and about basic biology. The principle says that
biological organisms on average and over time
act to minimize free energy. Free energy is the
sum of prediction error, which bounds the sur-
prise of the sensory input to the system. Put
one way, it  is  the idea that brains are hypo-
thesis-testing neural mechanisms, which sample
the sensory input from the world to keep them-
selves  within  expected  states.  Generalizing
greatly, one might say that, just as the heart
pumps blood, the brain minimizes free energy.
Before moving on to introduce and defend
this idea, it will be useful to explain why the
analogy to the functions of other organs is apt.
Once a function is identified it serves as a unify-
ing, organizing principle for understanding what
the organ does. For example, even though the
heart acts very differently during rest and exer-
cise, it still pumps blood. Similarly, even though
the brain acts very differently during the awake
state and during sleep it still minimizes free en-
ergy. Taking such a general approach therefore
helps to provide a unified account of the brain.
Related to this, there is a type of objec-
tion that will have little bite on the organ-fo-
cused account of the brain. To see this, consider
again the heart. The heart pumps blood, and
this function is realized in part by the way the
contraction of the heart muscle occurs—a pro-
cess that depends on intricate ion flows across
heart cell membranes. One should not object to
the notion that the heart pumps blood by refer-
ring to the fact that what happens in the heart
is an intricate cellular ion flow. This is so even
though one might be able to understand much
about the heart just by being told the cellular
and molecular story. The story about the func-
tion and the story about a level of realization of
that  function  are  not  in  conflict  with  each
other. Similarly, one cannot object to the free
energy  principle  by  pointing  to  facts  about
what the brain does (e.g., what happens as ac-
tion potentials  are generated,  or  as  long-term
potentiation is instantiated). The reason for this
is that those low-level processes might be ways
of  realizing free energy minimization.  At best
such objections are calls for explanatory work of
the sort “how can the generation of action po-
tentials be realizations of free energy minimiza-
tion?”
These two points together suggest that the
functional, organ-based account of the brain is
reductionist in two ways (familiar from discus-
sions in philosophy of science). On the one hand
it  seeks to reduce all  the different things the
brain does to one principle, namely free energy
minimization.  This is  a kind of  theory reduc-
tion, or explanatory unification. It says that one
theory explains many different things.  On the
other hand, it is consistent with a kind of meta-
physical reduction where the overall function is
in the end realized by a set of  basic physical
processes. Here, mental function is fully physical
and fully explained by free energy minimization.
It is interesting to note that no one would ob-
ject  to  such  a  two-fold  reductionism  for  the
heart and other organs, yet it is controversial or
even preposterous to do so for the organ that is
the brain. For these reasons, it is useful to keep
in mind the simple idea that the brain is also an
organ. Much of the discussion in this chapter re-
volves around these two reductive aspects: how
can the free energy principle explain everything?
And  can  it  provide  the  functional scaffolding
that would allow realization by brain activity?
2 Minimizing free energy (or average 
prediction error minimization)
Consider the following very broad, very simple,
but ultimately also very far-reaching claim: the
brain’s  main job is  to  maintain the organism
within a limited set of possible states. This is a
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fairly  trivial  claim,  since  it  just  reflects  that
there is a high probability of finding a given or-
ganism in some and not other states, combined
with  the  obvious  point  that  the  organism’s
brain,  when in good working order,  helps ex-
plain this fact. It is the brain’s job to prevent
the  organism from straying  into  states  where
the organism is not expected to be found in the
long run. This can be turned around such that,
for any given organism, there is a set of states
where  it  is  expected  to  be  found,  and  many
states in which it would be surprising to find it.
This is surely an entirely uncontroversial obser-
vation:  we don’t  find all  creatures  with equal
probability  in  all  possible  states  (e.g.,  in  and
out of water). Indeed, since an organism’s phen-
otype results from the expression of its genes to-
gether  with the  influence  of  the  environment,
we might define the phenotype in terms of the
states we expect it to be found in, on average
and  over  time:  different  phenotypes  will  be
defined by different sets of states. This way of
putting it then defines the brain’s job: it must
keep the organism within those expected states.
That is, the brain must keep the organism out
of states that are surprising given the organism
it is—or, in general,  the brain must minimize
surprise (Friston & Stephan 2007).
Here surprise should not be understood in
commonsense terms, in the way that a surprise
party, say, is surprising. “Surprise” is technically
surprisal or self-information, which is a concept
from information  theory.  It  is  defined  as  the
negative log probability of a given state, such
that the surprise of a state increases the more
improbable it is to find the creature in that cer-
tain state (in this sense a fish out of water is ex-
posed to a lot of surprise). Surprise is then al-
ways relative to a model, or a set of expecta-
tions (being out of water is not surprising given
a human being’s expectations). States in which
an organism is found are described in terms of
the causal impact from the environment on the
organism (for example, the difference to the fish
between being in water and being out of water).
This, in turn, can be conceptualized as the or-
ganism’s sensory input, in a very broad sense,
including not just visual and auditory input but
also  important  aspects  of  sensation  like  ther-
moreception, proprioception, and interoception.
Surprising states are then to be understood as
surprising sensory input, and the brain’s job is
to minimize the surprise in its sensory input—
to keep the organism within states in which it
will receive the kind of sensory input it expects.
To be able to use this basic idea about the
brain’s overall function in an investigation of all
the things minds do we need to ask how the
brain accomplishes the minimization of surprise.
It cannot assess surprise directly from the sens-
ory input because that would require knowing
the relevant probability distribution as such. To
do this  it  would  need  to,  impossibly,  average
over an infinite number of copies of itself in all
sorts of possible states in order to figure how
much of a surprise a given sensory input might
be.  This  means  that  to do its  job,  the brain
needs to do something else; in particular it must
harbor and finesse a model of itself in the envir-
onment, against which it can assess the surprise
of  its current sensory input.  (The model  con-
cerns expected sensory states, it is thus a model
of the states of the brain, defined by the sensory
boundary in both interoceptive and exterocept-
ive terms, see Hohwy 2014.)
Assume then that the brain has a model—
an  informed  guess—about  what  its  expected
states are, and then uses that model to generate
hypotheses that predict what the next sensory
input  should  be  (this  makes  it  a  generative
model). Now the brain has access to two quant-
ities, which it can compare: on the one hand the
predicted sensory input, and on the other the
actual sensory input. If these match, then the
model is a good one (modulo statistical optimiz-
ation).  Any  difference  between  them  can  be
conceived as prediction error, because it means
that  the  predictions  were  erroneous  in  some
way. For example, if a certain frequency in the
auditory input is predicted, then any difference
from what the actual auditory input turns out
to be is that prediction’s error.
The occurrence of prediction error means
the  model  is  not  a  good  fit  to  the  sensory
samples after all, and so, to improve the fit, the
overall prediction error should be minimized. In
the course of  minimizing prediction error,  the
brain averages out uncertainty about its model,
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and hence implicitly approximates the surprise.
It is guaranteed to do this by minimizing the di-
vergence  between  the  selected  hypothesis  and
the posterior probability of the hypothesis given
the evidence and model. The guarantee stems
from the facts that this is a Kullback-Leibler di-
vergence (KL-divergence) which is always zero
(when there is no divergence) or positive (when
there is prediction error), and which therefore
creates an upper bound on the surprise—min-
imizing this  bound will  therefore approximate
surprise.
The key notion here is that the brain acts
to  maintain  itself  within  its  expected  states,
which are estimated in prediction error minim-
ization. This is known as the free energy prin-
ciple, where free energy can be understood as
the sum of prediction error (this and the follow-
ing is based on key papers, such as  Friston &
Stephan 2007, Friston 2010, as well as introduc-
tions in  Clark 2013 and  Hohwy 2013). Predic-
tion error minimization itself instantiates prob-
abilistic,  Bayesian  inference  because  it  entails
that the selected hypothesis becomes the true
posterior,  given  evidence  and  model.  On  this
view, the brain is a model of the world (includ-
ing itself) and this model can be considered the
agent, since it acts to maintain itself in certain
states in the world.
3 Varieties of prediction error 
minimization
The central idea here is that, on average and
over the long run, surprising states should be
avoided, or, prediction error should be minim-
ized. Prediction error minimization can occur in
a number of ways, all familiar from debates on
inference to the best explanation and many de-
scriptions of scientific, statistical inference.
First, the model parameters can be revised
in  the  light  of  prediction  error,  which  will
gradually  reduce  the  error  and  improve  the
model fit. This is perception, and corresponds
to how a scientist seeks to explain away surpris-
ing evidence by revising a hypothesis. This per-
ceptual process was alluded to above.
Slightly more formally, this idea can be ex-
pressed in terms of the free energy principle in
the following terms. The free energy (or sum of
prediction error) equals the negative log prob-
ability of the sensory evidence, given the model
(the surprise) + a KL-divergence between the
selected  hypothesis  (the  hypothesis  about  the
causes of the sensory input, which the system
can change to change the free energy), and the
true  posterior  probability  of  the  hypothesis
given the input and model. Since the KL-diver-
gence is never negative, this means that the free
energy will bound (be larger than) the surprise.
Therefore,  the  system just  needs  to  minimize
the divergence to approximate the surprisal.
Second, the model parameters can be kept
stable and used to generate predictions—in par-
ticular,  proprioceptive  predictions,  which  are
delivered to the classic reflex arcs and fulfilled
there  until  the  expected  sensory  input  is  ob-
tained. This is action, and corresponds to how a
scientist  may retain  a  hypothesis  and  control
the environment for confounds until the expec-
ted evidence obtains. Since action is prediction
error minimization with a different direction of
fit, it is labeled active inference.
Slightly more formally (and still following
Friston),  this  notion  of  action  arises  from an-
other reorganization of the free energy principle.
Here, free energy equals complexity minus accur-
acy. Complexity may be taken as the opposite of
simplicity, and is measured as a KL-divergence
between the prior probability of the hypothesis
(i.e., before the evidence came in) and the hypo-
thesis selected in the light of the evidence. Intu-
itively, this divergence is large if many changes
were made to fit the hypothesis—that is, if the
hypothesis has significant complexity compared
to the old hypothesis. Accuracy is the surprise
about the sensory input given the selected hypo-
thesis—that is, how well each hypothesis fits the
input. Free energy is minimized by changing the
sensory data, such that accuracy increases. If the
selected  hypothesis  is  not  changed,  then  this
amounts  to  sampling  the  evidence  selectively
such that it  becomes less  surprising.  This  can
only happen through action, where the organism
re-organizes its sensory organs or whole body, or
world, in such a way that it receives the expec-
ted sensory data (e.g., holding something closer
in order to smell it).
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There are further questions one must ask
about action: how are goals chosen and how do
we work out how to obtain them? The free en-
ergy principle can be brought to bear on these
questions too. In a very basic way, our goals are
determined by our expected interoceptive and
proprioceptive states,  which form the basis of
homeostasis. If we assume that we can approx-
imate these expected states, as described above,
what remains is a learning task concerning how
we can maintain ourselves in them. This relies
on internal models of the world, including, cru-
cially, modeling how we ourselves, through our
action, impact on the sensory input that affects
our internal states. Further, we need to minim-
ize the divergence between,  on the one hand,
the states we can reach from a given point and,
on the other, the states we expect to be in. Re-
search is in progress to set out the details  of
this ambitious part of the free energy program. 
Third, the model parameters can be sim-
plified (cf. complexity reduction), such that the
model is not underfitted or overfitted, both of
which will generate prediction error in the long
run. This corresponds to Bayesian model selec-
tion, where complexity is penalized, and also to
how a scientist will prefer simpler models in the
long run even though a  more  complex model
may fit the current evidence very well. The ra-
tionale for this is quite intuitive: a model that is
quite  complex  is  designed  to  fit  a  particular
situation with particular situation-specific, more
or  less  noisy,  interfering  factors.  This  implies
that it will generalize poorly to new situations,
on  the  assumption  that  the  world  is  a  fairly
noisy  place  with  state-dependent  uncertainty.
Therefore,  to minimize prediction error in the
long run it is better to have less complex mod-
els. Conversely, when encountering a new situ-
ation, one should not make too radical changes
to one’s prior model. One way to ensure this is
to pick the model that makes the least radical
changes but still explains the new data within
expected  levels  of  noise.  This  is  just  what
Bayesian model selection amounts to, and this
is enshrined in the formulations of the free en-
ergy principle. A good example of this is what
happens during sleep, when there is no trust-
worthy  sensory  input  and  the  brain  instead
seems to resort to complexity reduction on syn-
thetic data (Hobson & Friston 2012).
Fourth, the hypotheses can be modulated
according to the precision of  prediction error,
such that prediction error minimization occurs
on the basis of trustworthy prediction error; this
amounts to gain control,  and functionally be-
comes attention. This corresponds to the neces-
sity for assessment of variance in statistical in-
ference, as well as to how a scientist is guided
by, and seeks out, measurements that are expec-
ted to be precise more than measurements that
are expected to be imprecise.
Precision optimization is attention because
it issues in a process of weighting some predic-
tion errors more than others, where the weights
need to sum to one in order to be meaningful.
Hence, peaks across the prediction error land-
scape reflect both the magnitude of the predic-
tion error per se and the weight given to that
error based on how precise it is expected to be.
This moves the prediction error effort around,
much like one would expect the searchlight of
attention to move around. 
Within this framework, there is room for
both endogenous and exogenous attention. En-
dogenous attention is  top-down modulation of
prediction error gain based on learned patterns
of precision. Exogenous attention is an intrinsic
gain operation on error units,  sparked by the
current signal strength in the sensory input; this
is based on a very basic learned regularity in
nature, namely that strong signals tend to have
high signal to noise ratio—that is, high preci-
sion.
In  all  this,  there  is  a  very  direct  link
between  perception,  action,  and  attention,
which will  serve to illustrate some of  the key
characteristics of the framework. In particular,
expected precision drives action such that sens-
ory sampling is guided by hypotheses that the
system expects will generate precise prediction
error.  A very simple  example  of  this  is  hand
movement.  For  hand movement  to  occur,  the
system needs to prioritize one of two competing
possible hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that
the hand is not moving, which predicts a partic-
ular  kind  of  (unchanging)  proprioceptive  and
kinesthetic input; the second hypothesis is (the
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false one) that the hand is moving, which pre-
dicts a different (changing) flow of propriocept-
ive and kinesthetic input. Movement will only
occur  if  the  second  hypothesis  is  prioritized,
which corresponds to the agent harboring the
belief that the hand is actually moving. If this
belief wins, then proprioceptive predictions are
passed to the body, where classic reflex arcs ful-
fill them. Movement is then conceived as a kind
of self-fulfilling prophecy.
A crucial question here is how the actually
false hypothesis might be prioritized, given that
the actually true hypothesis (that the agent is
not moving) has evidence in its favor (since the
agent is in fact not moving). Here expected pre-
cisions play a role, which means that action es-
sentially turns into an attentional phenomenon:
in  rather  revisionist  terms,  agency  reduces  to
self-organisation guided by long term prediction
error minimization. Hypotheses can be priorit-
ized  on  the  basis  of  their  expected  precision:
hence if future proprioceptive input is expected
to be more precise than current proprioceptive
input,  the  gain  on  the  current  input  will  be
turned down, depriving the hypothesis that the
agent is not moving of evidence. Now the bal-
ance shifts in favor of the actually false hypo-
thesis, which can then begin to pass its predic-
tions to the  sensorimotor system. This  rather
inferential  process  is  then  what  causes  move-
ment to occur. It  is  an essentially attentional
process because acting occurs when attention is
withdrawn from the actual input (Brown et al.
2013).
The outstanding issue for this story about
what it takes to act in the world is why there is
an expectation that future proprioceptive input
will  be  more  precise  than  the  current  input.
One possibility here is that this is based on a
prior  expectation  that  exploration (and hence
movement) yields greater prediction error min-
imization gains in the long run than does stay-
ing put. Conversely, this is the expectation that
the  current  state  will  lose  its  high-precision
status over time. Writ large, this is the prior ex-
pectation  concerning  precisions  (i.e.,  a  hy-
perprior), which says that the world is a chan-
ging place such that one should not retain the
same hypotheses  for  too  long:  when the  pos-
terior probability of a hypothesis becomes the
new  prior,  it  will  soon  begin  to  decrease  in
probability. This is an important point because
it  shows  that  the  ability  to  shift  attention
around in order to cause action is not itself an
action performed by a homunculus. Rather, it is
just a further element of  extracting statistical
information (about precisions) from the world.
4 Hierarchical inference and the 
recapitulating, self-evidencing, slowing
brain
A system that obeys the free energy principle
minimizes its free energy, or prediction error, on
average and over time. It does this through per-
ception, belief updating, action, attention, and
model simplification. This gives us the outline
of a very powerful explanatory mechanism for
the mind. There is reason to think that much of
this  explanatory  promise  can  be  borne  out
(Clark 2013; Hohwy 2013).
This mechanism shapes and structures our
phenomenology—it  shapes  our  lived,  experi-
enced world. A good starting point for making
good on this idea is the notion of hierarchical
inference, which is a cornerstone of prediction
error minimization.
Conceive of prediction error minimization
as being played out between overlapping pairs
of interacting levels of processing in the brain.
A pair has a lower level receives input, and a
higher  level  that  generates  predictions  about
the input at the lower level. Predictions are sent
down (or “backwards”) where they attenuate as
well as possible the input. Parts of the input it
cannot  attenuate  are  allowed  to  progress  up-
wards, as prediction error. The prediction error
serves as input to a new pair of levels, consist-
ing of the old upper level, which is now func-
tioning as lower input level, and a new upper
level. This new pair of levels is then concerned
with predicting the input that wasn’t predicted
lower down. This layering can then go on, creat-
ing in the end a deep hierarchy in our brains
(and perhaps a more shallow hierarchy in some
other creatures). The messages that are passed
around in the hierarchy are the sufficient stat-
istics: predictions and prediction errors concern-
Hohwy, J. (2015). The Neural Organ Explains the Mind.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 19(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570016 6 | 22
www.open-mind.net
ing (1)  the means of  probability  distributions
(or  probability  density  functions)  associated
with  various  sensory  attributes  or  causes  of
sensory input out there in the world, and (2)
the precisions (the inverse of variance) of those
distributions, which mediate the expected preci-
sions mentioned above.
The hierarchy gives a deep and varied em-
pirical  Bayes  or  prediction  error  landscape,
where prior probabilities are “empirical” in that
they are learned and pulled down from higher
levels, so they do not have to be extracted de
novo from the current input. This reliance on
higher levels means that processing at one level
depends  on  processing  at  higher  levels.  Such
priors higher up are called hyperparameters, for
expectations of means, and hyperpriors for ex-
pectations of precisions.
The  key  characteristics  of  the  hierarchy
are time and space. Low levels of the hierarchy
deal with expectations at fast timescales and re-
latively small receptive fields, while higher levels
deal  with  expectations  at  progressively  slower
timescales  and wider receptive fields.  That is,
different levels of the hierarchy deal with regu-
larities in nature that unfold over different spa-
tiotemporal  scales.  This  gives  a  trade-off
between detail and time horizon such that low
down in the hierarchy, sensory attributes can be
predicted in great detail but not very far into
the future, and higher in the hierarchy things
can be predicted further into the future but in
less detail. This is essential to inference because
different causal regularities in nature, working
at different time scales, influence each other and
thereby create non-linearities in the sensory in-
put.  Without  such interactions,  sensory  input
would be linear and fairly easy to predict both
in detail and far into the future. So the tem-
poral organization of the hierarchy reflects the
causal order of the environment as well as the
way the causes in the world interact with each
other to produce the flow of sensory input that
brains try to predict.
The  structure  of  the  hierarchy  in  the
brain, and thereby the shape of the inferences
performed in the course of minimizing predic-
tion error, must therefore mimic the causal or-
der of the world. This is one reason why hier-
archical  inference  determines  the  shape  and
structure of phenomenology, at least to the ex-
tent  that  phenomenology  is  representational.
The way inference is put together in the brain
recapitulates the causes we represent in percep-
tion.  Moreover,  this  is  done  in  an  integrated
fashion,  where different  sensory attributes  are
bound  together  under  longer-term regularities
(for  example,  the  voice  and  the  mouth  are
bound together under a longer-term expectation
about the spatial  trajectories  of  people).  This
immediately speaks to long-standing debates in
cognitive  science,  concerning  for  example  the
binding problem and cognitive penetrability (for
which  see  Chs.  5-6  in  Hohwy 2013).  Though
there is, of course, much more to say about how
prediction  error  minimization  relates  to  phe-
nomenology,  so far this  suggests that there is
some reason to think the austere prediction er-
ror minimization machine can bear out its ex-
planatory promise in this regard.
Goals and actions are also embodied in the
cortical  hierarchy.  Goals  are  expectations  of
which states  to occupy.  Actions ensue,  as  de-
scribed  above,  when  those  expected  states,
which  may  be  represented  at  relatively  long
timescales,  can  confidently  be  translated  into
policies  for  concrete  actions  fulfilled  by  the
body.  There are some thorny questions about
what these goals  might be and how they are
shaped. One very fundamental story says that
our expected states are determined by what it
takes to maintain homeostasis. We are creatures
who are able to harness vast and deep aspects
of the environment in order to avoid surprising
departures  from homeostasis;  though  this  op-
portunity comes with the requirement to harbor
an internal model of the environment. Reward,
here,  is  then  the  absence  of  prediction  error,
which  is  controlled  by  using  action  to  move
around in the environment, so as to maintain
homeostasis on average and in the long run.
Taking  a  very  general  perspective,  the
brain  is  then  engaged  in  maintaining  homeo-
stasis, and it does so by minimizing its free en-
ergy, or prediction error. Minimization of pre-
diction error entails building up and shaping a
model of the environment. The idea here is very
simple. The better the model is at minimizing
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prediction error  the more information it  must
be carrying about the true causes of its sensory
input. This means that the brain does its job by
recapitulating the causal structure of the world
—by explaining away prediction error, the brain
is essentially becomes a deeply structured mir-
ror of the world. This representational perspect-
ive is entailed by the brain’s efforts to maintain
itself in a low entropy or free energy state. This
means that we should not understand the brain
as first and foremost in the business of repres-
enting the world, such that it can act upon it—
which  may  be  an  orthodox  way  of  thinking
about what the brain does. Put differently, the
brain is not selected for its prowess in represent-
ation per se but rather for its ability to minim-
ize free energy. Even though this means repres-
entation is not foundational in our explanation
of the brain, it doesn’t mean that representa-
tion is sidelined. This is because we don’t un-
derstand what free energy minimization is un-
less we understand that it entails representation
of the world. (This formulation raises the issue
of the possibility of misrepresentation in predic-
tion error minimization, for discussion see  Ho-
hwy 2013, Chs. 7-8.)
The brain can be seen, then, as an organ
that minimizes its free energy or prediction er-
ror  relative to a model  of  the world and its
own expected states. It actively changes itself
and actively seeks out expected sensory input
in  an  attempt  to  minimize  prediction  error.
This means the brain seeks to expose itself to
input that it can explain away. If  it encoun-
ters a change in sensory input that it cannot
explain away, then this is evidence that it is
straying from its  expected  states.  Of  course,
the  more  it  strays  from its  expected  states,
the more we should expect it to cease to exist.
Put  differently,  the  brain  should  enslave  ac-
tion to seek out evidence it can explain away
because the more it does so, the more it will
have found evidence for its own existence. The
very  occurrence  of  sensory  input  that  its
model can explain away becomes an essential
part  of  the  evidential  basis  for  the  model.
This  means  the brain is  self-evidencing (Ho-
hwy 2014), in that the more input it can ex-
plain away, the more it gains evidence for the
correctness  of  the model  and thereby for  its
own existence. 
The notions of recapitulation of the world
and of self-evidencing can be captured in an ex-
ceedingly simple idea. The brain maintains its
own integrity in the onslaught of sensory input
by  slowing  down and  controlling  the  causal
transition of the input through itself. If it had
no  means  to  slow  down  the  input  its  states
would be at the mercy of the world and would
disperse  quickly.  To  illustrate,  a  good  dam-
builder must slow down the inflow of water by
slowing  down and  controlling  it  with  a  good
system of dams, channels, and locks. This dam
system must in some sense anticipate the flows
of water in a way that makes sense in the long
run and that  manages  flows  well  on  average.
The system will do this by minimizing “flow er-
rors”, and it and its dynamics will thereby carry
information  about—recapitulate—the states  of
water flow in the world on the other side of the
dam. In general,  it  seems any system that  is
able to slow the flow of causes acting upon it
must  be  minimizing  its  own  free  energy  and
thereby be both recapitulating the causes and
self-evidencing (Friston 2013).
With these extremely challenging and ab-
stract ideas, the brain is cast as an organ that
does one thing only: minimize free energy and
thereby provide evidence for its own existence.
Just  as  the  heart  can  change  its  beat  in  re-
sponse  to  internal  and  external  changes,  the
brain can change its own states to manage self-
evidencing according to circumstances: perceive,
act,  attend,  simplify.  The  weighting  between
these ways of minimizing prediction error is de-
termined by the context. For example, it may
be that learning is required before action is pre-
dicted to be efficient, so perception produces a
narrow prediction error bound on surprise be-
fore action sets in, conditional on expected pre-
cisions; or perhaps reliable action is not possible
(which may happen at night when sensory input
is so uncertain that it cannot be trusted) and
therefore  the  brain  simplifies  its  own  model
parameters, which may be what happens during
sleep (Hobson & Friston 2012).
This  is  all  extremely  reductionist,  in  the
unificatory sense, since it leaves no other job for
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the brain to do than minimize free energy—so
that everything mental must come down to this
principle. It is also reductionist in the metaphys-
ical sense, since it means that other types of de-
scriptions of mental processes must all come down
to the way neurons manage to slow sensory input.
The next sections turn to the question of
whether  this  extreme  explanatory  and  reduc-
tionist theory is not only controversial and am-
bitious but also preposterous.
5 A preposterous principle? Comparing 
the free energy principle with evolution
One way to curtail the free energy principle is
to allow that  the idea of  a hypothesis-testing
mechanism in the brain may be useful for some
but  not all purposes. Thus the idea could ex-
plain, say, visual illusions,  but not action. In-
deed, versions of the idea in this curtailed form
have  surfaced  many  times  in  the  history  of
philosophy of mind, vision science, and psycho-
logy (see Hohwy 2013, Introduction). One view
would  be  that  evolution  very  likely  has  re-
cruited something like hypothesis-testing, such
that the brain can represent the world, but that
this  likely co-exists  with many other  types of
mechanism  that  the  brain  makes  use  of,  for
good evolutionary reasons. From this perspect-
ive,  the universal  ambition of  the free  energy
principle is preposterous because it goes against
the  evolutionary  perspective  of  a  tinkering,
cobbled-together mechanism.
It is possible of course that a limited-use,
Bayesian neural mechanism has evolved in this
way. There is no strong evidence that there is in
fact  something  like  a  circumscribed,  modular
mechanism. For example, Bayes optimal integ-
ration  seems  to  work  across  modalities  and
types of sensory attributes (Trommershäuser et
al. 2011). On the other hand, there is not yet
strong empirical evidence for the ubiquitousness
of  free  energy  minimization,  though  there  is
emerging evidence of its usefulness for explain-
ing a very surprising range of mental phenom-
ena, from visual perception, illusion, movement,
decision, and action.
Speaking more conceptually,  the free en-
ergy principle is not a theory that lends itself
particularly well to piecemeal, curtailed applica-
tion. Recall that the principle concerns the very
shape and structure of the brain, mirroring as it
does the causal structure of the world. The very
hierarchical morphology of the organ is shaped
by free energy minimization. This means that
other neural mechanisms, that are not involved
in prediction error minimization, would have to
have evolved in a way parasitic on the free en-
ergy principle rather than alongside it. In this
sense,  the free  energy principle  would,  at  the
very  least,  lay  the  foundation  for  everything
else. Against this, it could be said that perhaps
parts  of  the  brain  are  not,  strictly  speaking,
part of  hierarchical  inference.  Perhaps subcor-
tical nuclei have evolved independently of free
energy. This is therefore an argument for which
empirical  evidence  would  be  important:  are
there areas of the brain that are not best de-
scribed  in  terms  of  prediction  error  message
passing?
Continuing the very general approach, the
free energy principle has such generality that it
tends  to  monopolize  explanation.  To  demon-
strate  this,  consider  the  theory  of  evolution,
which is also an extremely ambitious theory in
the sense that it aims to explain all parts of bio-
logy with just a few very basic tools. It is con-
ceptually possible to curtail this theory: perhaps
it explains only 70% of life, leaving some other
mechanism to explain the rest, or perhaps it ex-
plains only non-human life, leaving some deity
to fully explain us. This kind of curtailed view
would of course ignore the mountain of evidence
there is for evolution in absolutely all parts of
life (a point we will revisit in a moment), but it
would also  miss  something about the kind of
theory that the theory of evolution is. It seems
that, as an explanation, evolution is so powerful
that it would be incredible that something else
would be equally able to explain life.
Whereas it cannot be stipulated that the
theory of evolution is true universally, it can be
argued that if it is true, it is true everywhere.
To  see  this,  consider  that  if  incontrovertible
evidence was found that evolution does not ex-
plain, say, the eight eyes of most spiders, then
for most people that would cast aspersions on
the theory of evolution in all other areas—even
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where  it  is  backed  up  with  overwhelmingly
strong evidence. This is not simply to say that
some recalcitrant evidence lowers the posterior
probability of the theory somewhat, but rather
that  it  would  begin  to  completely  undermine
the theory. It seems the theory of evolution pos-
its  such  a  fundamental  mechanism  that  any-
thing short of universal quantification would in-
validate it.
Perhaps we can describe what goes on in
terms of “explaining away” (Pearl 1988). Ima-
gine, for example, that one night the electricity
in your house cuts out. You consider two hypo-
theses: that a possum has torn down the power
line to your house, or that the whole neighbour-
hood has blacked out  due  to the recent  heat
wave.  Out in  the street  you see  other  people
checking their fuse boxes and this evidence fa-
vours the second hypothesis.  Importantly, this
evidence considerably lowers the probability of
the possum hypothesis even though the two hy-
potheses could be true together. There is debate
about what explaining away really is, but agree-
ment that it exists. Part of what grounds this
notion is that our background knowledge of the
frequency  of  events  tells  us  that  it  would  be
rather  an  unusual  coincidence  if,  just  as  the
overall power goes out due to the heat wave, a
possum caused the line to go down (unless pos-
sums are known to take to power lines during
heat waves). In the case of the deity hypothesis
and the evolutionary hypothesis, it seems that
explaining away is particularly strong. It would
be an utterly astrounding coincidence if some-
thing as fundamental as speciation and adapta-
tion had two coinciding explanations.
After this excursion into philosophy of sci-
ence, we can return to the free energy principle.
Though it still has nothing like the amount of
evidence  in  its  favour  that  evolution  has,  it
seems that if it is true then it too must apply
everywhere,  and if  not then it  must  be false.
There is no middle way. This again seems to re-
late to explaining away. It would be too much of
a coincidence if two explanations both accoun-
ted for something as fundamental as the organ-
ism’s  ability  to  sustain  itself  in  its  expected
states.  If  the  principle  was  directed  at  only
fairly superficial  aspects  of  mentality,  such as
the nature of visual illusions, then it would not
strongly explain away other theories. But this
misrepresents how deep the explanatory target
actually is.
The  issue  was  whether  the  explanatory
ambition of the free energy principle can be cur-
tailed, in order to make it seem less preposter-
ous.  If  it  is  assumed that  explaining  away is
particularly strong for fundamental rather than
superficial explanations, then it appears that a
principle  as  fundamental  as  the  free  energy
principle cannot be curtailed. If it is believed,
then it  is  believed  with  maximal  scope.  It  is
therefore misguided to think that one can take
a divide and conquer approach to the free en-
ergy principle. 
Of course, this can be taken to cement its
preposterousness. If it is a hypothesis designed
to be universal,  then how can it  be anything
but  preposterous?  The  immediate  answer  to
this lies in comparing it again to the theory of
evolution. This venerable theory must be pre-
posterous in just the same way, but of course it
isn’t—it  is  true.  This  means  that  the  issue
whether the free energy principle is preposter-
ous cannot be decided just by pointing to its
explanatory ambition, since this would also in-
validate  the  theory  of  evolution.  Not  surpris-
ingly,  it  must  be  resolved  by  considering  the
evidence in favour of the free energy principle.
As  mentioned,  this  does  not  yet  compare  to
that  of  the  theory  of  evolution,  though  it  is
noteworthy that evidence is coming in, and that
it is coming in from research on a comfortably
large suite of mental phenomena.
Consider next the question of what hap-
pens  with  existing,  competing  theories  once
something like the free energy principle or the
theory of evolution begins to gain explanatory
force.  Existing theories may have considerable
evidence in their favour (this may be a theory
about a cognitive or perceptual domain, such as
attention  or  illusion);  and  they  may  explain
away the existing evidence relatively well  and
therefore  have  that  evidence  in  their  favour
(this  contrasts  with  the  comparison  with  the
deity hypothesis, which strictly speaking has no
evidence in its favour). Nevertheless, once addi-
tional, relevant evidence becomes available, ex-
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isting theories may begin to lose ground to a
new theory, like the free energy principle, even
if it as yet has less evidence in its favour. For
example, once it is noted that the brain is char-
acterized by plentiful backwards connections, it
becomes clear  that  these  must  be  relevant to
phenomena like attention and illusion (for ex-
ample, disrupting them disrupts attention and
illusion).  However,  if  existing  theories  cannot
explain this new evidence, then a new theory
can begin to usurp their explanatory job. This
means  the  evidence  in  their  favour  begins  to
wane, even if the new theory is still only enjoy-
ing spotty support. Compare again to the elec-
tricity blackout example. There might be a very
impressive theory of the whereabouts and heat
wave-related  behavior  of  possums  that  very
snugly explains the blackout in the house and
perhaps other things besides. But the moment
we become aware that the whole neighborhood
is without electricity, even a poor theory of the
blackout that can also address  this  new evid-
ence  (“perhaps  it  is  some  central  distributor
thingamajig  that  has  broken  down”)  becomes
much more attractive than the existing possum
theory. New evidence and new theories can very
quickly wreak havoc on old, cherished theories.
The free  energy  principle  should  therefore  be
expected to usurp the explanatory jobs of exist-
ing theories, and thereby challenge them, even if
it is still a fairly fledgling theory. Of course, ex-
planatory usurpation depends on acknowledging
the  occurrence  of  new  evidence,  such  as  the
presence of backwards connections in the brain.
Perhaps it is no surprise that the free energy
principle  is  beginning  to  gain  ground  just  as
imaging brain science is  maturing beyond the
phase in which it  was concerned mainly with
collecting new evidence, and on to a new phase
in which researchers consider the theoretical sig-
nificance of the evidence in terms of both func-
tional specificity and effective connectivity.
6 Predictions, distinctness, fecundity
It will be useful to discuss a concrete example
of explanatory contest for the free energy prin-
ciple. A good example comes from Ned Block &
Susanna Siegel (2013) who argue against Andy
Clark’s  (2013)  version  of  the  predictive  pro-
cessing framework in a way that pertains to the
preceding  remarks  about  explanatory  prowess
and ambition. In a comparison with an existing
theory of attentional effects (proposed by Mar-
isa Carrasco), they argue first that the predict-
ive  framework  makes  false  predictions,  and
second that it offers no distinctive explanations.
As to the first point, Block and Siegel con-
sider the effect where covert attention to a weak
contrast grating enhances its perceived contrast.
They argue that this increased contrast should
be unexpected and therefore should elicit a pre-
diction  error  that  in  turn  should  be  extin-
guished, thereby annihilating the perceptual ef-
fect that the account was meant to explain in
the  first  place.  However,  their  argument  does
not rely on the correct version of the free energy
account of attention. Block and Siegel overlook
the fact that attention is itself predictive, in vir-
tue of the prediction of precision. This means
that  attention  enhances  the  prediction  error
from the  weak  grating,  which  in  turn  is  ex-
plained away under the hypothesis that a strong
contrast grating was present in that location of
visual space. This conception of attention thus
does  yield  a  satisfactory  account  of  the  phe-
nomenon that they claim cannot be explained
(attentional enhancing), and it does not gener-
ate the false  predictions they suggest (Hohwy
2013).
Block  and  Siegel’s  second  point  is  more
difficult  to  get  straight.  They  argue  that  the
predictive account offers no explanation of at-
tentional findings, in particular relating to re-
ceptive field distortions; they then suggest that
the  account  could  adopt  the  existing  theory,
which asserts that “representation nodes” have
shrinking receptive fields. They continue to ar-
gue  that  since  the  purported  prediction  error
gain relates to error units in the brain rather
than representation nodes, the prediction error
account cannot itself generate this explanation.
The argument is then that if the prediction pro-
cessing account simply borrows that explanation
(namely  the  existing  explanation  in  terms  of
representation nodes), it hasn’t offered anything
distinctive.  Again,  this  rests  on  an  incorrect
reading of the free energy account: error units
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are not insulated from representation units. Er-
ror units receive the bottom-up signal and this
leads  to  revision  of  the  predictions  generated
from the representation units. The outstanding
question  is  how  the  distortions  of  receptive
fields can be explained within the prediction er-
ror account.
This  question has been addressed within
the predictive coding literature. Thus Spratling
(2008), who is a proponent of predictive coding
accounts of attention, says (referring to the lit-
erature  on  changing  receptive  fields  to  which
Block and Siegel themselves appeal) “the [pre-
dictive processing] model proposes, as have oth-
ers before, that the apparent receptive field dis-
tortion arises from a change in the pattern of
feedforward  stimulation  received  by  the  cell”.
That is, increased gain explains the distortion of
the receptive field.
In fact, one might speculate that the pre-
dictive processing story makes perfect sense of
the existence of modulable receptive fields. The
receptive field of a given representational unit
would, that is, be a function of the prediction
error received from below, where—as described
earlier—lower  levels  operate  at  smaller  spati-
otemporal scales. To give a toy illustration, as-
sume that a broad receptive field would receive
an equal amount of error signal from ten lower
units each with smaller receptive fields, whereas
a narrow receptive field receives error only from
two such units. For the broad receptive field, if
the gain on error from lower unit numbers one
and  two  increases  due  to  attention,  then  the
gain on the other eight units decreases (since
weights sum to one). Now, the hitherto broad
receptive  field  mainly  receives  error  from two
lower units, so its receptive field has automatic-
ally shrunk. Attentional effects thus track the
effects of expected precisions.
Here a more specific  point can be made
about  Block  and  Siegel’s  argument.  The  pre-
dictive processing account of attention can po-
tentially offer a distinctive explanation of rather
finegrained  attentional  findings.  There  is  also
reason to think that this explanation has more
promise than existing theories. This is because
the existing theories help themselves to the no-
tion of ‘representational nodes’ whereas the free
energy principle explains what these are, what
they  do,  and  how  they  connect  with  other
nodes.  Moreover,  the  prediction  error  account
can deal very elegantly for key receptive field
properties (Rao & Ballard 1999; Harrison et al.
2007).
This seems to be a good example of the
situation  outlined  earlier  with  respect  to  the
contest  between the free energy principle  and
existing theories. The free energy principle can
explain more types of evidence, under a more
unificatory framework, and this immediately be-
gins to undermine existing theories. Specifically,
the theory that has no role for prediction error
in  receptive  field  modulation  and  activation
only in representation nodes is explained away,
even if it has significant evidence in its favour.
Underlying this story, there are some lar-
ger issues in the philosophy of science. One is-
sue concerns the role of unification in explana-
tion (Kitcher 1989). This is the idea that there
are explanatory dividends in explanations that
unify  a  variety  of  different  phenomena  under
one theory. Obviously the free energy principle
is  a  strong,  ambitious  unifier  (perception,  ac-
tion, and attention all fall under the principle).
Whereas there is discussion about whether this
in itself adds to its explanatory ability as such,
the ability to unify with other areas of evidence
is  part  of  what  makes  an  explanation  better
than others. Noting this aspect of the free en-
ergy principle therefore supports it, in an infer-
ence  to  the  best  explanation  (Lipton 2004,
2007). Confronted with a piecemeal explanation
of a phenomenon and a unificatory explanation
of the same phenomenon, the inference to the
latter is stronger. There may be some difficult
assessments concerning which explanation best
deals  with the available  evidence.  In the case
discussed above,  the free energy principle  can
explain  less  of  the  attention-specific  evidence
than  the  piecemeal  explanation,  but  on  the
other hand it can explain more kinds of evid-
ence, it provides explanatory tools that are bet-
ter motivated (roles of representation and error
725 units), and it offers a more unifying account
overall.
A second issue from the philosophy of sci-
ence, in particular concerning inference to the
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best explanation, is the fecundity of an explana-
tion,  which  is  regarded as  a  best-maker.  The
better an explanation is at generating new pre-
dictions and ways of asking research questions,
the  stronger  is  the  inference  in  its  favour.
Whereas this is not on its own a decider, it is
an important contributor to the comparison of
explanatory frameworks. Block and Siegel also
seem to suggest that the predictive framework
has nothing new to offer, or at least very little
compared to existing (piecemeal) theories. Their
example of a piecemeal theory is Carrasco’s im-
pressive  work  on  attention,  which  has  proven
extraordinarily fecund, leading to a series of dis-
coveries about attention. Assessing which theory
is the more fecund is difficult, however, and in-
volves considerations of unification. The free en-
ergy  principle,  as  described  above,  does  not
posit  any fundamental difference between per-
ception and action. Both fall out of different re-
organisations of the principle and come about
mainly as different directions of fit for predic-
tion  error  minimization  (Hohwy 2013,  2014).
This means that optimization of expected preci-
sions, and thereby attention, must be central to
action as well as to perception. This provides a
whole new (and thus fecund) source of research
questions for the area of action, brought about
by  viewing  it  as  an  attentional  phenomenon.
Important modeling work has been done in this
regard (Feldman & Friston 2010), age-old ques-
tions (such as our inability to tickle ourselves)
have been re-assessed (Brown et al. 2013), and
new  evidence  concerning  self-tickle  has  been
amassed (Van Doorn et al. 2014). Theoretically,
this has led to the intriguing idea that action
occurs when attention is withdrawn from cur-
rent  proprioceptive  input  (described  above).
This idea points to a fully integrated view of at-
tention, where attention is ubiquitous in brain
function  (with  deep  connections  to  conscious-
ness, Hohwy 2012).
There is  thus fecundity on both sides of
this debate. It is difficult to conclusively adju-
dicate which side is  more fecund,  in part be-
cause the new research questions are in different
areas and with different theoretical impact. It is
surprising to be told that too much attention
can  undermine  acuity—which  is  an  example
from Block and Siegel—but it is also surprising
to  be  told  that  action  is  an  attentional  phe-
nomenon. 
The third issue from the philosophy of sci-
ence concerns theory subsumption. It would be
very odd if the explanations associated with the
free energy principle (e.g., that attention is op-
timization  of  expected  precision)  completely
contradicted  all  existing,  more  piecemeal  ex-
planations of  attention. It  should be expected
that explanations of attention have some over-
lap with each other, as they are explaining away
overlapping bodies of evidence. Indeed, the free
energy explanation seems to subsume elements
of biased competition theories of attention, as
well  as elements of  Carrasco’s theory,  as seen
above. This raises the question of to what ex-
tent  a  new theory,  like  the  free  energy  prin-
ciple’s account of attention, really contributes a
new and better understanding,  especially if  it
carries within it elements of older theories. One
way to go about this question again appeals to
inference to the best explanation. The new and
the old theories overlap in some respects,  but
they differ in respect of further elements of uni-
fication,  theoretical  motivation,  broadness,
fecundity, and so on. It can be difficult to come
up with a scheme for precise assessment of these
features, but it seems not unreasonable to say
that the free energy principle performs best on
at least those further elements of what makes
explanations best.
At this stage it is tempting to apply the
free  energy principle  to  itself.  This  is  an apt
move  since  the  idea  of  the  hypothesis-testing
brain arose in comparison with scientific prac-
tice  (Helmholtz 1867;  Gregory 1980).  On this
view, the point of a good scientific theory is to
minimize prediction error as well as possible, on
average and in the long run. This imputes an
overall weighting of all the very same elements
to  science  as  we  have  ascribed  to  the  brain
above: revise theories in the light of evidence,
control for confounds by making experimental
manipulations, be guided by where highly pre-
cise  evidence  is  expected  to  be  found,  adopt
simple theories that diverge minimally from old
theories,  and  let  theories  have  a  hierarchical
structure such that they can persist in the face
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of non-linearities (due to causal interactions) in
the evidence. All of these considerations speak
in favour of the free energy principle over piece-
meal, existing theories. By absorbing and revis-
ing older theories under the hierarchically im-
posed scientific “hyperparameter” of the free en-
ergy  principle,  it  seems  a  very  reasonable
weighting of all these aspects can be achieved.
For example, aspects  of  Carrasco’s theory are
subsumed, but under revised accounts of its no-
tions  of  the  functional  role  of  representation
nodes; due to the hierarchical aspect it is able
to  account  for  evidence  arising  under  atten-
tional  approaches  to  action;  in  addition,  this
subsumption may be fecund, since we could ex-
pect it to lead to new findings in action (for ex-
ample,  a  prediction  that  there  will  be  atten-
tional enhancement in the sensorimotor domain,
leading to “illusory action”).
7 The triviality worry
There is a different worry about preposterous-
ness, also related to the issue of evidence. This
worry is that the free energy principle is so gen-
eral that anything the brain does can be con-
strued as minimizing its prediction error. This is
most  clearly  seen  once  the  idea  is  cast  in
Bayesian  terms.  The  brain  harbours  priors
about the causes in the environment, and it cal-
culates  likelihoods  that  it  combines  with  the
priors to arrive at posterior probabilities for the
hypotheses in question. One way to make this
story apply to a particular case is to ascertain
what is believed and then in a retrodictive fash-
ion,  posit  priors  and  likelihoods  accordingly
unto the brain in question. If this can always be
done, then the theory is trivialised by “just-so”
stories and explains nothing. It is then prepos-
terous  because  it  pretends  to  be  fundamental
but is just trivial.
This triviality worry alerts the defender of
the free energy principle to some pitfalls, but it
is not a critical worry. To see this, an appeal
can again be made to the theory of evolution. It
is  clear  that  when  described  in  very  general
terms, anything can be described as enhancing
fitness.  For  example,  in  an  infamous  hoax,
Ramachandran gave a ridiculous, just-so adapt-
ationist  account  of  why  gentlemen  prefer
blondes  (Ramachandran &  Blakeslee 1998),
which some reportedly took seriously.  Yet,  no
one serious thinks this invalidates the theory of
evolution. The reason is, to repeat, that there is
abundant solid, non-trivial evidence in favour of
evolution. In other words, the presence of just-
so triviality at some level of description can co-
exist with non-trivial explanations at the level
of detailed, quantifiable evidence. Therefore the
free energy principle cannot be invalidated just
because it invites just-so stories. Of course, it is
then hostage to translation into more precise,
constricted  applications  to  various  domains,
where predictions can be quantified and just-so
stories avoided. Though there is nowhere near
the same evidence that we have for the theory
of evolution, evidence of this sort is becoming
available (some is reviewed in Hohwy 2013).
Whereas the triviality worry does not in-
validate the free energy principle, it does alert
to some pitfalls. In particular, when forming hy-
potheses  and  when  explaining  phenomena  in
Bayesian terms, priors should not be stipulated
independently of other evidence. If there is inde-
pendent reason for asserting a prior with an ex-
planatory role,  then it  is  less  likely  that  this
prior is part of a just-so story. Similarly, discov-
ery and manipulation of  priors has a particu-
larly important role in the defence of the free
energy principle  as applied to perception. For
example, there is independent evidence that we
expect light to come more or less from above
(Adams et al. 2004),  that objects  move fairly
slowly (Sotiropoulos et al. 2011), and that we
expect  others  to  look at us (Mareschal et  al.
2013).  Once  established  on  independent
grounds, researchers are better able to appeal to
such  priors  in  other  explanations.  This  then
helps avoid the just-so pitfall.
The triviality  worry  was  that  everything
we do can be made to fit with the free energy
principle. A different worry is that almost noth-
ing we do fits with the free energy principle. If
the free energy principle basically says the brain
is an organ that tries to slow down the causal
impact upon it from the world, then why don’t
organisms  with  brains  just  seek  out  sensory
deprivation such as dark, silent rooms (Friston
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et al. 2012)? This dark room problem is aired
very often and is natural on first thought when
considering prediction error minimization. How-
ever, it also rests on a fundamental misreading
of the free energy principle. The principle is es-
sentially about maintaining the organism in its
expected states, homeostatically defined, on av-
erage and in the long run. Locking oneself up in
a dark silent room will only produce transitory
free-energy minimization, as the demands of the
world and the body will not be avoided for long.
Soon, action is required to seek food, and soon
the local council will come round to switch off
the gas. It is much better for the brain to har-
ness the deep model of the world in order to
control its movement through the environment
and thereby maintain itself  more efficiently in
its expected states.
Notice that this point harks back to a very
basic hyperprior mentioned above—namely that
the world is a changing place so that occupying
the same state for too long will incur increasing
free energy costs. This means that even if you
currently have the prior that sensory depriva-
tion is the right strategy for minimizing free en-
ergy, and even if this strategy works initially (as
it  does  after  a  long  and  stressful  day),  that
prior will decrease in strength as time goes by—
leading to action and thus escape from sensory
deprivation.
This response to the dark room problem in
fact has a parallel in evolutionary theory. It has
been  argued  that  the  free  energy  principle  is
false, essentially because not every action con-
tributes  directly  to  instantaneous  prediction-
error minimization and, analogously, it could be
objected  that  evolutionary  theory  is  false  be-
cause not every trait directly contributes to in-
stantaneous fitness. But of course this is a poor
objection  because  fitness  is  measured  over
longer timescales and some traits, such as span-
drels, contribute indirectly to fitness.
This and the preceding two sections have
considered whether the explanatory ambition of
the  free  energy  principle  is  preposterous.  By
comparing the principle with the theory of evol-
ution, and casting the worry in terms of philo-
sophy of science, it can be seen that the explan-
atory ambition is not preposterous in and of it-
self.  The  verdict  on  the  principle  must  come
down to the quality of the explanations it offers
and the amount of evidence in its favour. The
principle is bound to be controversial, however,
because  it  strongly  explains  away  competing
theories.
Of course, there are further issues to ex-
plore regarding the analogy between the free en-
ergy principle and the theory of evolution, and
no doubt the analogy will have its limits. One
interesting issue concerns the possibility of the-
ory revision and thereby the possibility that the
original statement of a theory is strictly speak-
ing, false, even if it is one of those theories with
extreme explanatory scope. The notion of nat-
ural  selection  as  the  only  mechanism  behind
evolution is, for example, put under pressure by
the discovery of genetic drift. This has led to re-
vision of the theory of evolution, to encompass
drift.  Could  something  similar  happen to  the
free energy principle, or is it in effect so ambi-
tious that it is unrevisable? Conversely, is there
any conceivable evidence that could falsify the
current  version  of  the  theory  in  a  wholesale
fashion,  rather  than  the  piecemeal,  detailed
fashion discussed above? There are various an-
swers available here, all of which reflect the pe-
culiar  theory  emerging  from  the  free  energy
principle.
First, the current form of the principle it-
self results from a long series of revisions of the
basic idea that the brain engages in some kind
of inference. Helmholtz’ and Ibn Al Haytham’s
original ideas (reviewed briefly in Hohwy 2013)
have  been  greatly  revised,  particularly  in  re-
sponse to the mathematical realisation that the
inversion of  generative models  presents  an in-
tractable  problem,  thus  calling  for  variational
Bayesian approaches to approximate inference.
These  developments occured partly  in  concert
with the empirical discovery that the brain, as
mentioned  above,  is  characterized  by  massive
backwards connectivity. It is then not unreason-
able to say that older feed-forward versions of
computational, information theoretical (e.g., in-
fomax)  theories  of  cognition  constitute  earlier
versions of  the free energy principle  and that
the latter is a revision in the light of formal and
empirical discovery. The analogy with theory of
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evolution  can  thus  be  maintained  in  at  least
this backwards-looking respect.
Second,  a  more  forward-looking  example
concerns the nature of the backwards connectiv-
ity in the brain. The free energy principle deems
these  descending  signals  predictions, but  cru-
cially it needs them to be of two kinds, namely
predictions  of  the  means  of  the  underlying
level’s representations, and, as mentioned briefly
above, predictions of the precisions of the un-
derlying  representations  (thus  encompassing
sufficient statistics).  There is  some direct and
some circumstantial evidence in favour of this
dual role for descending signals, but the empir-
ical  jury is  still  out.  Should it  be found that
descending signals do not mediate expected pre-
cisions, this would falsify the free energy prin-
ciple. Notice that this falsification would be spe-
cific to the free energy principle, since the ele-
ment  of  expected  precisions  is  not  found  in
some of the much broader theories in the aca-
demic marketplace that seem to countenance a
predictive element in cognition. Notice also that
a  failure  to  identify  top-down expectations  of
precision would amount to a wholesale falsifica-
tion of the principle, since these “second-order”
expectations are crucial not only for perception
but also for action and action initiation (as ex-
plained above). 
Third, and speaking much more generally,
the principle would be falsified if a creature was
found that did not act at all to maintain itself
in  a  limited  set  of  states  (in  our  changing
world). Such a creature should not on average
and over time change its model parameters or
active states and yet it would be able to prevent
itself from being dispersed with equal probabil-
ity among all possible states. This is a clear no-
tion of a strong falsifier, and it speaks to the
beauty  of  the  free  energy  principle  since  it
showcases its deep link between life and mind.
However,  it  is  not a very feasible  falsifier  be-
cause there is significant doubt that we would
classify such a ‘creature’ as being alive or being
a creature at all. Consider, for example, that a
simple  rock  would  serve  as  a  falsifier  in  this
sense since it is maintained on average and over
the long run (that is, its states do not immedi-
ately  disperse).  One  possibility  here  (Friston
2013) is to require that the scope is restricted to
creatures that are space-filling, that is, who vis-
its the individual states making up their overall
set of expected states. A falsifier would then be
a creature that manages to be space-filling but
who does not manage this by changing its in-
ternal and active states via variational Bayes.
One nice question, in all of this, is whether
the theory of evolution and the free energy prin-
ciple can co-exist—and if so, how. This is a sub-
stantial issue, and a pertinent one, since both
theories are fundamental and pertain to some of
the same aspects—such as morphology, pheno-
types, and life. Here is not the place to try to
answer this interesting question, though inevit-
ably some initial  moves are made that  might
start to integrate them.
8 How literally is the brain Bayesian?
Bayes’ rule is difficult to learn and takes consid-
erable conscious effort to master. Moreover, we
seem  to  flout  it  with  disturbing  regularity
(Kahneman et al. 1982). So it is somewhat hard
to believe that the brain unconsciously follows
Bayes’ rule. This raises questions about how lit-
erally  we  should  think  of  the  brain  as  a
Bayesian hypothesis-tester. In blog correspond-
ence,  Lisa  Bortolotti  put  the  question  suc-
cinctly: 
Acknowledging  that  prior  beliefs  have  a
role in perceptual inference, do we need to
endorse  the view that  the  way in which
they  constrain  inference  is  dictated  by
Bayes’  rule?  Isn’t  it  serendipitous  that
something we came up with to account for
the rationality of updating beliefs is actu-
ally  the  way in  which  our  brain  uncon-
sciously works?
Part of the beauty of the free energy principle is
that even though it begins with the simple idea
of an organism that acts to stay within expec-
ted states, its mathematical formulation forces
Bayesian  inference  into  the  picture.  Expected
states  are  those  with  low surprisal  or  self-in-
formation.  That is  they have high probability
given the model (low negative log probability).
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These states cannot be estimated directly be-
cause that would require already knowing the
distribution of states one can be in. Instead it is
estimated indirectly, which is where the free en-
ergy comes in. Free energy, as mentioned above,
is  equal  to  the  surprisal  plus  the  divergence
between the probability of the hypothesis cur-
rently entertained by the brain’s states and the
true posterior of the hypothesis given the model
and the state.  This much follows from Bayes’
rule itself. This means that if the brain is able
to minimize the divergence, then the chosen hy-
pothesis becomes the posterior. This is the cru-
cial step, because a process that takes in evid-
ence, given a prior, and ends up with the pos-
terior probability, as dictated by Bayes, must at
least implicitly be performing inference (Friston
2010). 
Hence, if the free energy principle is cor-
rect,  then  the  brain  must  be  Bayesian.  How
should this be understood? Consider what hap-
pens as the divergence is minimized. Formally
this is  a Kullback-Leibler divergence (or cross
entropy),  which  measures  the  dissimilarity
between two probability distributions. The KL-
divergence can be minimized with various min-
imization  schemes,  such  as  variational  Bayes.
This plays an important role in machine learn-
ing and is used in simulations of cognitive phe-
nomena using the free energy principle. Given
the detail and breadth of such simulations, it is
not unreasonable to say that brain activity and
behavior  are  describable  using  such  formal
methods.
The brain itself does not, of course, know
the complex differential  equations  that  imple-
ment variational Bayes. Instead its own activity
is brought to match (and thereby slow down)
the occurrence of its sensory input. This is suffi-
cient to bring the two probability distributions
closer because it can only do this if it is in fact
minimizing prediction error. This gives a mech-
anistic realization of the hierarchical, variational
Bayes. The brain is Bayesian, then, in the sense
that  its  machinery  implements  Bayes  not
serendipitously but necessarily,  if  it  is  able to
maintain itself in its expected states. (There is
discussion within the philosophy of neuroscience
about  what  it  means  for  explanations  to  be
computational.  See  papers  by  Piccinini 2006,
Kaplan 2011,  Piccinini &  Scarantino 2011,
Chirimuuta 2014.)
The notion of realization (or implementa-
tion, or constitution) is itself subject to consid-
erable  philosophical  debate.  A  paradigmatic
reading describes it in terms of what plays func-
tional  roles.  Thus  a  smoke  alarm can be  de-
scribed in terms of its functional role (i.e., what
it, given its internal states, does, given a certain
input). The alarm has certain kinds of mechan-
isms,  which  realize  this  role.  This  mechanism
may  comprise  radioactive  ions  that  react  to
smoke and causes the alarm to sound. The ana-
logy between the  smoke  alarm and the  brain
seems accurate enough to warrant the paradig-
matic functionalist reading of the way neuronal
circuitry  implements  free  energy  minimization
and therefore Bayes. Perhaps it is in some sense
a  moot  point  whether  the  ions  in  the  smoke
alarm “detect smoke” or whether they should
merely be described in terms of the physical re-
actions that happen when they come into con-
tact with the smoke particles. Rather than enter
this  debate  it  seems  better  to  return  to  the
point  made at the start,  when the brain was
compared  to  other  organs  such  as  the  heart.
Here the point was that it is wrong to retract
the description of the heart as a blood pump
when we are told that no part of the cardiac
cells are themselves pumps. The brain is liter-
ally  Bayesian  in  much the same sense as  the
heart is literally a pump.
Behind this conceptual point is a deeper
point about what kind of theory the free energy
principle gives rise to (the following discussion
will  be  based  on  Hohwy 2014).  As  described
above, the Bayesian brain is entailed by the free
energy  principle.  Denying  the  Bayesian  brain
then requires denying the free energy principle
and the very idea of the predictive mind. This
is, of course, a possible position that one could
hold. One way of holding it is to “go down a
level” such that instead of unifying everything
under the free energy principle, theories just de-
scribe  the  dynamical  causal  interactions
between  brain  and  world.  This  would  corres-
pond to focusing more on systematic elements
in the realization than in the function (looking
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at  causal  interaction  between  the  heart  and
other parts of the body, and the individual dy-
namics of the cells making up the heart, rather
than  understanding  these  in  the  light  of  the
heart being a pump). Call this the “causal com-
merce” position on the brain. Given the extens-
ive  and  crucial  nature  of  causal  commerce
between  the  brain  and  the  world,  this  is  in
many ways a reasonable strategy. It seems fair
to characterize parts of the enactive cognition
position  on  cognitive  science  as  informed
primarily by the causal commerce position (for
a  comprehensive  account  of  this  position,  see
Thompson 2007; for an account that brings the
debate closer to the free energy principle,  see
Orlandi 2013).
From this perspective, the choice between
purely  enactive  approaches  and  inferential,
Bayesian  approaches  becomes  methodological
and explanatory. One key question is what is
accomplished by re-describing the causal com-
merce position from the more unified perspect-
ive of the free energy principle. It seems that
more principled, integrated accounts of percep-
tion, action, and attention then become avail-
able. The more unified positioin also seems to
pull away from many of the lessons of the en-
active approach to cognition, because the free
energy principle operates with a strict inferen-
tial veil between mind and world—namely the
sensory evidence  behind which  hidden causes
lurk, which must be inferred by the brain. Tra-
ditionally, this picture is anathema to the en-
active, embodied approaches, as it lends itself
to various forms of Cartesian skepticism, which
signals  an  internalist,  secluded  conception  of
mind. A major challenge in cognitive science is
therefore to square these two approaches: the
dynamical nature of causal commerce between
world, body, and brain and the inferential free
energy principle that allows their unification in
one account. On the approach advocated here,
modulo  enough  empirical  evidence,  denying
that  the  free  energy  principle  describes  the
brain is on a par with denying that the heart is
a pump. This means that it is not really an op-
tion to deny that the brain is inferential. This
leaves open only the question of how it is infer-
ential.
One  line  of  resistance  to  subsuming
everything under the free energy principle has
to do with intellectualist connotations of Bayes.
Somehow the idea of the Bayesian brain seems
to deliver a too regularized, sequential, mathem-
atical desert landscape—it is like a picture of a
serene, computational mechanism silently taking
in data, passing messages up and down the hier-
archy,  and spitting out posterior probabilities.
This seems to be rather far from the somewhat
tangled mess observed when neuroscientists look
at  how the brain is  in fact  wired up.  In one
sense this desert landscape is of course the true
picture that comes with the free energy prin-
ciple, but there need be nothing serene or regu-
larized about the way it is realized. The reason
for this goes to the very heart of what the free
energy principle  is.  The principle  entails  that
the brain recapitulates the causal structure of
the world. So what we should expect to find in
the brain will have to be approximating the far-
from-serene  and  regularized  interactions  that
occur between worldly causes. Just as there are
non-linearly  interacting  causes  in  the  world
there will be convolving of causes in the brain;
and just as there are localized, relatively insu-
lated causal “eddies” in the world there will be
modularized parameter spaces in the brain. 
Moreover,  there  is  reason  to  think  the
brain  utilizes  the  fact  that  the  same  causes
are  associated  with  multiple  effects  on  our
senses and therefore builds up partial models
of the sensorium. This corresponds to cognit-
ive  modules  and  sensory  modalities  allowing
processing  in  conditionally  independent  pro-
cessing  streams,  which  greatly  enhances  the
certainty  of  probabilistic  inference.  In  this
sense the brain is not only like a scientist test-
ing hypotheses,  but  is  also  like  a courtroom
calling  different,  independent  witnesses.  The
courtroom  analogy  is  worth  pursuing  in  its
own right (Hohwy 2013), but for present pur-
poses it supports the suggestion that when we
look at the actual processing of the brain we
should  expect  a  fairly  messy  tangle  of  pro-
cessing  streams.  (Clark 2013 does  much  to
characterize  and  avoid  this  desert  landscape
but seems to do so by softening the grip of the
free energy principle.) 
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9 Functionalism and biology
So far the free energy principle has been given a
functionalist  reading.  It  describes a functional
role, which the machinery in the brain realizes.
One of the defining features of functionalism is
that it allows multiple realization. This is the
simple idea that the same function can be real-
ized in different ways, at least in principle. For
example, a smoke alarm is defined by its func-
tional role but can be realized in different ways.
There is on-going debate about whether some-
thing with the same causal profile as the human
brain could realize  a mind.  Philosophers  have
been fond of imaging, for example, a situation
in which the population of Earth is each given a
mobile  phone and a set  of  instructions about
whom to call and when, which mimics the “in-
structions”  followed  by  an  individual  neuron
(Block 1976). The question then is whether this
mobile  phone  network  would  be  a  mind.
Though this is not the place to enter fully this
debate, it  seems hard for the defender of  the
free energy principle to deny that, if these mo-
bile phone-carrying individuals are really linked
up in the hierarchical message-passing manner
described by the equations of  the free energy
principle,  if  they  receive  input  from  hidden
causes,  and  if  they  have  appropriate  active
members, then they do constitute a mind.
However, a different issue here is to what
extent the free energy principle allows for the
kind of multiple realization that normally goes
with functionalism. The mathematical formula-
tions and key concepts of the free energy prin-
ciple  arose  in  statistical  physics  and  machine
learning, and hierarchical inference has been im-
plemented in computer learning (Hinton 2007).
So there is reason to think that prediction error
minimization can be realized by computer hard-
ware as well as brainware. There is also reason
to think that within the human brain the same
overall  prediction  error  minimization  function
can be realized by different hierarchical models.
Slightly different optimizations of expected pre-
cisions would determine the top-down vs. bot-
tom-up dynamics differently,  but may show a
similar ability to minimize prediction error over
some  timeframes.  Different  weightings  of  low
and high levels in the hierarchy can lead to the
same ability to minimize prediction error in the
short and medium term. This is similar to how
a dam can be controlled with many small plugs
close to the dam wall,  or by fewer connected
dam locks operating at longer timescales further
back from the dam wall.  In  some cases,  such
different realizations may have implications for
the organism over the long run, however (for ex-
ample, building locks in a dam may take time,
and  thus  allow  flows  in  the  interim;  whereas
many small plugs prevent flows in the short run
term but may be impractical in the long run).
Such differences may show up in our individual
differences  in  perceptual  and  active  inference
(for an example, see  Palmer et al. 2013), and
may also be apparent in mental illness (Hohwy
2013, Ch. 7).
Functionalist  accounts  of  the  mind  are
widely discussed in the philosophical literature,
and there are various versions of it. A key ques-
tion for any functionalism is how the functional
roles  are defined in  the  first  instance  (for  an
overview see Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson 2006).
Some  theories—psychofunctionalism  or  empir-
ical  functionalism—posit  that  functional  roles
should  be  informed  by  best  empirical  science
(“pain  is  caused  by  nociceptor  activation…
etc.”). The consequence is that their domain is
restricted to those creatures for whom that em-
pirical science holds. Other theories—common-
sense  functionalism—begin  with  conceptual
analysis and use that to define the functional
roles (“pain is the state such that it is caused
by bodily damage, gives rise to pain-avoidance
behavior,  and  relates  thus  and  so  to  internal
states…”). The consequence of taking the com-
monsense approach is that such functionalisms
apply widely, including to creatures science has
never reached, in so far as they have something
realizing that functional role.
There are some nice questions here about
what we should really say about creatures with
very different realizations of the same functions
(e.g., “Martian pain”), and creatures with very
similar realizations but different functions (e.g.,
“mad pain”; see  Lewis 1983). Setting those is-
sues  aside  for  the  moment,  one  question  is
which kind of functionalism goes with the free
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energy  principle.  There  is  no  straightforward
answer here, but one possibility is that it is a
kind  of  “biofunctionalism”,  where  the  basic
functional role is that of creatures who manage
to maintain themselves within a subset of pos-
sible states (in a space-filling or active manner)
for a length of time. Any such creature must be
minimizing its free energy and hence engaging
in inference and action. It is biological function-
alism because it begins by asking for the biolo-
gical  form—the  phenotype—of  the  candidate
creature.
This is an extremely abstract type of func-
tionalism,  which  allows  considerable  variation
amongst phenotypes and hence minds. For ex-
ample,  it  has  no  problem  incorporating  both
Martians and madmen in so far as they main-
tain themselves in their expected states. It will
however specify the mental states of the organ-
ism when it becomes known in which states it
maintains  itself.  This  follows  from the  causal
characterization  of  sensory  input,  internal
states,  and active  output  that  fully  specify  a
prediction  error  minimizing  mechanism.  Once
these states are observed, the states of the sys-
tem can be known too, and the external causes
rendered  uninformative  (i.e.,  the  sensory  and
active  states  form a  Markov  blanket;  Friston
2013).
What drives  biofunctionalism is  not  spe-
cies-specific  empirical  evidence,  as  in  psycho-
functionalism. And it does not seem to be com-
monsense conceptual analysis either. Rather, it
begins with a biological, statistical observation
that is as basic as one can possibly imagine—
namely  that  creatures  manage  to  maintain
themselves  within  a  limited  set  of  states.  As
seen at the very start of this paper, this defines
a probability density for a given creature, which
it must approximate to do what it does. For an
unsupervised  system,  it  seems  this  can  only
happen if  the organism minimizes its free en-
ergy and thereby infers the hidden causes of its
sensory input, and then acts so as to minimize
its  own  errors.  This  is  an  empirical  starting
point at least in so far as one needs to know
many empirical facts to specify which states a
creature  occupies.  But  it  is,  arguably,  also  a
conceptual point in so far as one hasn’t under-
stood what a biological creature is if one does
not associate it at least implicitly with filling
some specified subset of possible states. 
The upshot is  that the free energy prin-
ciple sits well with a distinct kind of functional-
ism, which is here called biofunctionalism. It re-
mains an open question how this would relate
to  some versions  of  functionalism and related
views,  such as teleosemantics  (Neander 2012),
which relies on ideas of proper function, and in-
formation theoretical views (Dretske 1983). The
biofunctionalism  of  the  free  energy  principle
seems to have something in common with those
other kinds of positions though it has no easy
room for the notion of proper function and it
doesn’t rely on, but rather entails, information
theoretical (infomax) accounts.
Setting aside these theoretical issues, note
that  biofunctionalism  has  a  rather  extreme
range because it entails that there is Bayesian
inference even in very simple biological organ-
isms in so far as they minimize free energy. This
includes for example E. coli that with its char-
acteristic  swimming-tumbling  behavior,  main-
tains  itself  in  its  expected  states.  And  it  in-
cludes  us,  who  with  our  deeper  hierarchical
models  maintain  ourselves  in  our  expected
states  (with  more  space-filling  and  for  longer
than  E. coli). Of course, one might ask where,
within such a wide range of creatures, we en-
counter  systems  that  we  are  comfortable  de-
scribing as minds—that is, as having thought,
as  engaging  in  decision-making  and  imagery,
and not least as being conscious. This remains a
challenge for the free energy principle, just as it
is a challenge for any naturalist theory of the
mind to specify where, why, and how these dis-
tinctions between creatures arise.
10 The neural organ can explain the mind
The brain is an organ with a function, namely
to enable the organism to maintain itself in its
expected  states.  According  to  the  free  energy
principle, this is to say that it minimizes predic-
tion  error  on  average  and over  the  long  run.
This  is  a controversial  idea, with extreme ex-
planatory ambition. It might be considered not
only  controversial  but  also  preposterous.  But
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the  philosophy  of  science-based  discussions
above have sought to show that it is not in fact
preposterous.  The  different  ways  in  which  it
might be preposterous either do not apply, mis-
understand the principle, or would also apply to
the paradigmatically non-preposterous theory of
evolution.  The  free  energy  principle  yields  a
theory  that  should,  indeed,  strongly  explain
away competing theories. The free energy prin-
ciple is  an account that displays a number of
explanatory  virtues  such  as  unification  and
fecundity. It is therefore not reasonable to de-
tract from the principle by claiming it is prepos-
terous or too ambitious. Scientifically speaking,
what remains is to assess the evidence for and
against  the free energy principle  and consider
how,  more  specifically,  it  explains  our  mental
lives  (a  task  I  undertake  in  Hohwy 2013).
Speaking in terms of philosophy of mind, there
remain questions about what type of functional-
ist  theory the free energy principle  is,  how it
performs  vis-à-vis  traditional  questions  about
functionalism  and  the  realizers  of  functional
roles,  and,  finally,  some  more  metaphysical
questions about what it says about the nature
of the mind in nature. None of these philosoph-
ical issues are apparently more damning for the
free  energy principle  than they are  for  other,
previously proposed accounts of the nature of
the mind, and there is reason to think that with
the free energy principle a new suite of answers
may become available.
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